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1 
A Modest Proposal on Supreme Court Unanimity to 
Constitutionally Invalidate Laws 
Dwight G. Duncan* 
fK==fkqolar`qflk=
There is a problem in our constitutional history: the problem of 
split U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating democratically en-
acted laws. From Dred Scott1 to Lochner2 to Roe v. Wade3 to Citizens 
United,4 and even the recent Second Amendment decisions of Heller5 
and McDonald,6 these patently fallible decisions on controversial po-
litical and social issues have divided the nation, politicized the Court, 
poisoned the U.S. Supreme Court nomination process, and thwarted 
the balance of power created by the three branches of government 
which maintains democracy. Because of these consequences, this paper 
proposes requiring U.S. Supreme Court unanimity to overturn legis-
lation on constitutional grounds, an alternative which is morally and 
politically desirable. I leave for another occasion the legal and practical 
questions of how to implement such a unanimity requirement. 
While the audacity of this idea is perhaps remarkable, flying as it 
does in the face of our unbroken history of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
decided by majority vote of the Justices, I would ask the readers’ indul-
gence or suspension of disbelief for long enough to at least consider 
the argument. 
Before expounding on the subject of this article, however, I think 
it important to share some personal background and beliefs. I have 
 
 *  Dwight G. Duncan is a professor at the University of Massachusetts School of Law in 
Dartmouth, MA. I wish to gratefully acknowledge the help I have received on this article from 
various colleagues and friends, starting with our Dean Eric Mitnick, Professor Richard Peltz-
Steele, and ace editor Ethan Dazelle. More recently, my good friend Edward Boyer has helped 
with the editing and ideas, and my law students David Melanson and Christopher Leazott have 
helped with the footnotes. 
 1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 6. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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taught, or tried to teach, Constitutional Law for over a quarter cen-
tury. By Constitutional Law I mean U.S. Supreme Court case-law pur-
porting to interpret the U.S. Constitution. This can be a challenge, 
partly because familiarity can breed contempt, or at least a kind of 
jaundice. I must admit I have become more cynical about a subject 
where the U.S. Constitution means just what a majority of nine ap-
pointed lawyers say it means, for better or worse, regardless of what 
the text actually says and originally meant. After all, the Justices inter-
pret the U.S. Constitution through lenses colored by their own per-
sonalities and political perspectives. So do we all, of course. 
But I also have been frustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ques-
tionable basis for deciding constitutional issues like abortion and gay 
marriage. The effect is to remove these contentious issues from the 
political process and make them unamenable to democratic compro-
mise by deciding them as a matter of constitutional right in which the 
prevailing side takes all. Likewise, objections could easily be raised to 
the questionable invalidation, on constitutional grounds, of gun con-
trol laws7 and campaign finance regulation8—also decided by split vote, 
even by 5-4 vote of the U.S. Supreme Court. Count me as skeptical of 
rule by judge. 
Moreover, I find constitutional expectations to be unreasonable at 
times. Parties to cases, and even the general public, somehow expect 
the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve all the issues presented to the 
Court, and ultimately all the issues of the day, regardless of whether 
the U.S. Constitution and the laws actually address those issues. And 
so, the Justices can dragoon the Constitution, by hook or by crook, in 
the event no ordinary legal basis is at hand, to resolve cases before 
them. As the Pulitzer-Prize winning musical Of Thee I Sing noted in 
song in the early 1930s,9 “On that matter no one budges, for all cases 
of the sort are decided by the Judges of the Supreme Court.”10 
The text of the U.S. Constitution, though, cannot be shoehorned 
into being made capable of resolving every case. To the extent that the 
 
 7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
 8. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 9. The 1932 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Drama, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pu-
litzer.org/winners/george-s-kaufman-morrie-ryskind-and-ira-gershwin (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018). 
 10. GEORGE GERSHWIN & IRA GERSHWIN, TRUMPETER BLOW YOUR HORN, in Of 
Thee I Sing, (1931) (it sounds better if Ira Gershwin’s lyrics are sung to the music of George 
Gershwin, of course). 
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U.S. Constitution does not decide the question at hand, freedom pre-
vails, or should prevail. One might even cite the religious maxim, “in 
necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas”— “unity in 
necessary things, freedom in doubtful ones and love in everything,”11—
but applying it to constitutional interpretation. 
ffK==`lkpqfqrqflk^i=fks^ifa^qflk=
My concern is solely with U.S. Supreme Court split or non-unan-
imous decisions that purport to invalidate laws, regulations, decrees, 
or government practices—whether legislative, executive, or judicial in 
character—on the grounds that the said rules or practices—whether 
national, state, or local in scope—violate the U.S. Constitution. Cases 
decided on the basis of federal laws and regulations, or for that matter 
state laws or regulations, in contrast, do not generate the same con-
cerns. For these purely statutory or regulatory cases can always be re-
versed in the ordinary course by new laws passed by Congress, state 
legislatures, new executive orders, or regulations formulated by the ex-
ecutive or administrative agencies, whether federal or state. So, if the 
U.S. Supreme Court makes mistakes in deciding such matters, the mis-
takes can be corrected fairly simply through representative govern-
ment and the democratic process. 
But where unelected Justices invalidate contested laws as a matter 
of constitutional right, and they get it wrong, they remove effective 
sovereignty from the people; for there is no reasonably practical way 
to undo the harm. The ruling is the practical final word, unappealable 
to, and unamendable by, the political branches. Apart from the U.S. 
Supreme Court eventually overruling itself, such as when it overturned 
Lochner v. New York in the 1930s (allowing the regulation of working 
hours, in spite of Lochner’s ruling that freedom of contract prevented 
such regulation),12 there is no democratic recourse short of attempting 
to amend the U.S. Constitution or to impeach the offending Justices. 
And such recourse is rarely possible and never successful in the case of 
impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 
Now that I have clarified what I am and am not writing about, let 
us narrow in on the assertion that unanimity is both morally and po-
litically desirable. The U.S. Constitution begins with the words “[w]e 
 
 11. MARCO ANTONIO DE DOMINIS, DE REPUBLICA ECCLISIASTICA 676 (1617). 
 12. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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the people,” and the theory is that sovereignty ultimately comes from 
the people13: government “of the people, by the people, [and] for the 
people,” in the immortal words of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.14 
However, if the Court can invalidate laws and regulations enacted by 
the political branches through the democratic process on the grounds 
that they violate the Constitution, even when it is just on the say-so of 
a bare majority of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, decisions are rendered 
morally suspect. This exercise of judicial review is undemocratic, un-
less the majority rule is based on a constituency of nine. 
This feature of judicial review is a central paradox because this tug-
of-war between people and elites over what rules should govern them 
and who gets to decide is at the heart of our political and legal history, 
from civil war to civil rights, to culture wars, to political correctness. 
In other words, non-unanimous constitutional decisions short-circuit 
the political and legislative processes. Where legislation is overturned 
on a split 5-4 vote, the problem is magnified. It means that the consti-
tutional issue has been settled by the swing vote, usually Justice Ken-
nedy in recent history.15 This gives new meaning to the principle of 
“one person, one vote,”16 meaning that the individual with the swing 
vote is the only vote that ultimately counts. 
The Massachusetts Constitution says that a government should 
be one of laws and not of men.17 But 5-4 splits mean that our govern-
ment is palpably one of men (or women, since Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor was also the swing vote in her day)18 and decidedly not the 
rule of law. If a constitutional interpretation is truly correct as a le-
gal matter, as opposed to a political matter, then it should be able to 
convince the entirety of the Court, irrespective of political affiliation. 
Constitutional decisions that are less than unanimous reflect 
merely political choices. 
A related problem with non-unanimous and thus non-authorita-
tive U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating legislation is, as 
touched upon earlier, the practical difficulty of overturning them. This 
is because, under Article V, repeated supermajorities are necessary to 
amend the U.S. Constitution (two-thirds of both houses of Congress 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 14. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 15. See e.g. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 16. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). 
 17. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30. 
 18. See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
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and three-quarters of the states, apart from the never-employed state-
initiated convention route).19 Amendments have only happened a 
handful of times in our history.20 This recourse is virtually impossible 
for any socially controversial issues, which are often the subject of the 
most divisive and invidious U.S. Supreme Court decisions. And while 
impeachment of sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices has been at-
tempted several times in our history, none have actually succeeded.21 
So the threat of impeachment is a paper tiger at most. 
Now, if the U.S. Supreme Court makes a mistake in interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution to invalidate laws, significant time amounting to 
decades, or even a Civil War, must intervene. For example, it took the 
ratification of the Thirteenth22 and Fourteenth Amendments23 to over-
turn the notorious 1857 Dred Scott decision.24 In contrast, the require-
ment of unanimity would assure that the Court’s reading of the U.S. 
Constitution was truly unimpeachable and authoritative. It would also 
depoliticize the current bitterly partisan judicial nomination and con-
firmation process of presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme 
Court;25 and for these reasons it would be both morally and politically 
desirable. The country is currently very divided and polarized. The 
U.S. Constitution, as our fundamental law, should be a force that 
unites Americans and inculcates respect for law. Split constitutional 
decisions which invalidate democratically enacted laws instead divide 
the American people. 
fffK==te^q=tlria=e^mmbk=fc=^=orib=lc=rk^kfjfqv=tbob=
^almqba\=
In reviewing judicial history, I will consider unanimous U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions separate and apart from 5-4 cases and other 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 20. Additional Amendments of the Constitution, BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE, 
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/additional-amendments/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2018). 
 21. Senate Prepares for Impeachment Trial, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.sen-
ate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Tries_Justice.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 25. The Editorial Board, Opinion, The Supreme Court as Partisan Tool, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2017),  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/the-supreme-court-as-partisan-
tool.html?mcubz=0. 
(1) DUNCAN.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:39 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
6 
cases marked by dissent. This is because unanimous cases have unim-
peachable authority. For example, the landmark case of Brown v. 
Board of Education, is viewed as one of the most authoritative U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, in part because it was unanimously decided. 
It also declared segregation in public schools to be a violation of equal 
protection of the laws;26 as did its companion case of Bolling v. 
Sharpe,27 for schools in the District of Columbia. Brown is the gold 
standard for good constitutional decision-making by the Court, and 
Chief Justice Warren was appropriately careful to work to en-
sure its unanimity. 
Another example of unanimous constitutional decision-making in-
validating laws is Marbury v. Madison,28 which established the princi-
ple of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and, in the 
process, invalidated section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.29 These 
cases, while not technically infallible, are considered to be definitive, 
even if they were not originally, and widely accepted throughout our 
history as truly authoritative. The same note of unimpeachable author-
ity extends also to the unanimous decision in McCulloch v. Maryland30 
defining the reach of the “necessary and proper clause”31 of Article 1, 
Section 8 and the consequent unconstitutionality of Maryland’s at-
tempt to tax the Second Bank of the United States.32 
fsK==qeb=elooloI=qeb=eloolo=
Split decisions are obviously more problematic. On a number of 
occasions, the original minority view, with the passage of significant 
time, became the eventual majority view.33 We can start with Dred 
Scott and add Lochner for good measure.34 
Dred Scott v. Sandford decided that African Americans were not 
citizens and could not sue in federal court.35 Furthermore, it held that 
 
 26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 27. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 29. Id. at 178. 
 30. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 32. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436–37. 
 33. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
624–31 (1919). 
 34. The academic consensus on those cases is unanimous, or virtually so. 
 35. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404. 
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the right of slaveholding was protected by substantive due process of 
the Fifth Amendment (thus making it the first substantive due process 
case),36 and that therefore the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which 
outlawed slavery in federal territories north of a certain latitude) was 
unconstitutional.37 This decision was only the second time the U.S. 
Supreme Court had constitutionally invalidated a law passed by Con-
gress. It provoked the American Civil War.38 It took the war and both 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
to undo the damage that the Dred Scott decision had done. But the 
decision was not unanimous, as it occasioned two dissents by Justices 
Mclean and Curtis, to their everlasting credit.39 Had we only recog-
nized as authoritative constitutional decisions that are unanimous in 
invalidating laws or regulations, Dred Scott would not have had this 
horrific effect because it was not unanimous. And the debate over slav-
ery would have remained in the political branches. 
Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905, decided that maximum 
hour legislation for bakers was unconstitutional because such legisla-
tion violated freedom of contract,40 a liberty substantively protected 
from state interference by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.41 It took thirty years for this economic era of substantive 
due process to be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court,42 and in the 
meanwhile, the Lochner precedent prevented the enactment and en-
forcement of progressive social legislation for the workplace.43   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36. Id. at 450. 
 37. Id. 
 38. History.com Editors, Dred Scott Decision, History.COM (Oct. 27, 2009), http://ww 
w.history.com/topics/black-history/dred-scott-case. 
 39. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 529 (7-2 decision) (McLean, J., Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 40. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905). 
 41. Id. at 52. 
 42. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 43. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65. Lochner was decided 5-4 and featured a famous dissent by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes where he stated that our Constitution does not enshrine any 
particular economic theory, like laissez-faire. 
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Indeed, virtually all the substantive due process cases invalidating 
legislation—starting with Dred Scott44 and proceeding through Loch-
ner,45 Meyer v. Nebraska,46 Griswold v. Connecticut,47 Roe v. Wade48 
and Obergefell v. Hodges49—were split decisions and thus non-au-
thoritative in my view and would have vanished if unanimity were re-
quired. The only substantive due process case that was unanimous 
and would stand was the 1925 case Pierce v. Society of Sisters to be 
discussed below. 
sK==qeb=dlla=`^pbp=ab`faba=rk^kfjlrpiv=
Leading the parade of great unanimous constitutional decisions 
that invalidated legislation is, as I have noted, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.50 The holding of that case, was enforced unanimously in 
Cooper v. Aaron, which rejected, “a claim by the Governor and Leg-
islature of a state that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal 
court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the 
United States Constitution.”51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, another 
great unanimous decision, ruled that a statutory state monopoly on ed-
ucation violated the substantive due process rights of parents to direct 
the upbringing and education of their children.52 Also in line with these 
cases is the 1960s case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which said that 
freedom of speech and of the press under the First Amendment, as 
applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment,53 entailed a higher 
standard of proof before libel damages could be recovered by public 
officials,54 regardless of state law which established a lower standard 
of proof.55 
 
 
 44. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393. 
 45. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. 
 46. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating law restricting foreign-
language teaching). 
 47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 52. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925). 
 53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
 54. Id. at 279–80. 
 55. Id. at 283–84. 
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One could argue with the textual basis in the U.S. Constitution for 
unanimous decisions, of course, but the fact that they were unanimous 
and widely accepted in practice makes them authoritative nonetheless. 
For example, in the freedom of religion area, the Court recently and 
unanimously decided that both the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required a ministerial exemp-
tion from employment discrimination laws, so that churches rather 
than government would ultimately decide who authorized teachers of 
their religion.56  
Gideon v. Wainwright, a unanimous 1963 decision, extended the 
right to counsel to state proceedings and ruled that the government 
had to pay for legal representation for indigents in criminal proceed-
ing.57 There was also the Court’s unanimous decision in Loving v. Vir-
ginia in 1967 that bans on interracial marriage violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.58 Or Shelley v. Kraemer from 1948, invalidating the 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants under the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
Another unanimous constitutional decision striking down the ap-
plication of a state law would be Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Les-
bian and Bisexual Group of Boston, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously decided in 1995 that the application of state public ac-
commodation law to a parade violated the private parade organizer’s 
freedom of speech and expressive association.60 These unanimous de-
cisions have stood the test of time and have been accepted both morally 
and politically. 
sfK==qeb=_^a=pmifq=ab`fpflkp=
In contrast, however, the controversial non-unanimous decisions 
like Roe v. Wade61 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey62—the abortion 
 
 56. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 188– 89 (2012). 
 57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 59. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). 
 60. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995). 
This case is a personal favorite because I wrote the briefs for petitioner Wacko Hurley in the 
case. Under my suggested approach of recognizing only unanimous constitutional decisions in-
validating laws as authoritative, all these previously mentioned judgments invalidating laws or 
their application would stand. 
 61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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cases—and U.S. v. Windsor63 and Obergefell v. Hodges64—the gay 
marriage cases—would not stand as authoritative. The effect would be 
to return these divisive subjects to the political arena, where compro-
mise could be reached, rather than an all-or-nothing judicial approach 
based on the inflexible rights-based assertion of individuals. 
While some social conservatives might argue, “that’s all well and 
good for social conservatives like you,” they should not lose sight of 
the fact that the recent controversial 5-4 decisions of Citizens 
United—invalidating campaign finance regulations under the First 
Amendment as applied to corporations65—and the Heller66 and 
McDonald67 decisions—invalidating gun control legislation under the 
Second Amendment—would also be non-operative because they are 
non-unanimous. Indeed, the split Court decisions invalidating affirm-
ative action plans,68 or invalidating some of the Voting Rights Act ex-
tension,69 would also fail. 
Of course, this modest proposal is not without a few hiccups, 
bumps, and limits. It would, for example, rob certain constitutional 
cases of their precedential value, since they were split decisions. And 
so, the dormant commerce clause cases, which establish the principle 
that states may neither discriminate against out-of-state commerce, 
nor excessively burden interstate commerce, if the burden clearly ex-
ceeds the putative local benefit,70 would no longer hold sway. Similarly, 
cases like Miranda v. Arizona,71 that have become fairly settled features 
of our legal landscape, would no longer control if my proposal was ap-
plied retroactively. But if such rules like the Miranda rights are a good 
idea—and time has indeed demonstrated their wisdom—then there 
would be no problem with legislatively and democratically enacting 
them. Admittedly, these split constitutional decisions changed the po-
litical dynamic. But it seems important that ultimate responsibility for 
constitutional social change rests with the elected, democratically re-
 
 63. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 64. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 65. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 66. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 67. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 68. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 69. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 29 (2013). 
 70. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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sponsible branches. The same might be said of gay marriage or per-
missive abortion laws, if that is what the political reality is—as opposed 
to a judicially mandated fiat supposedly grounded in the          
U.S. Constitution. 
Indeed, the enactment of laws from split Court decisions would 
represent a solemn democratic ratification of the wisdom of the U.S. 
Supreme Court; as happened, for example, when the Civil Rights Act 
of 196472 effectively ratified and extended the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
unanimous 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.73 Such cases 
have become constitutional bedrock. It would be inconceivable for 
these to disappear now that the source of sovereignty, the people, so 
ardently demand such things from their government. 
Some legislators rather like having controversial issues (e.g., gun 
rights, abortion rights, gay marriage rights, and freedom from cam-
paign finance limitations) be decided by the courts, because then they 
do not have to take a stand pro or con and can claim that this matter is 
out of their hands and rests with the courts. But, allowing the shirking 
of personal responsibility by politicians and passing the buck to the 
courts is not an acceptable form of representative democracy. Indeed, 
resting ultimate responsibility for our laws with the political branches 
as opposed to the courts may help cure legislative dysfunction. 
sffK==^=`^pb=ql=qeb=`lkqo^ov=
One split constitutional decision that was of enormous importance 
and precedential value is Baker v. Carr,74—the Warren Court decision 
from the 1960s that subjected the apportionment of legislatures to ju-
dicial review under the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, it re-
versed a longstanding holding that apportionment was a political ques-
tion and thus not justiciable by the courts. The case involved vigorous 
dissents from Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. In overturning the 
egregiously disparate state legislative districts in Tennessee, the deci-
sion rectified an obvious unfairness—departure from the equal princi-
ple of “one person, one vote.” 
Following a rule of unanimity to invalidate the practice on 
that constitutional basis, however, would mean there would be no such 
 
 72. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 74. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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result. Is that really defensible? How can a non-representative legisla-
ture be expected to reform itself in the direction of more equal repre-
sentation? The rule of constitutional unanimity would not be cost-free. 
Under this proposal the U.S. Supreme Court would have to wait 
until the judgment of unconstitutionality became unanimous. I suspect 
that would not be difficult nowadays after the path-breaking precedent 
of Baker v. Carr. But one of the progeny of U.S. Supreme Court over-
sight of equal voter strength was Bush v. Gore,75—a split decision on 
constitutional grounds that rightly lives in judicial infamy. To have the 
2000 election be resolved by the political branches, and not by the 
Court, would be a historical bonus.76 
As suggested above, there is a practical issue that needs to be ad-
dressed: would such a rule of constitutional unanimity to invalidate 
laws be applied retroactively? Since the reason for such a rule is based 
on the bloopers of history, the whole point of the proposal is to clear 
up the mess retroactively and not just going-forward. The answer to 
this would depend upon how many people are tired of leaving life-
changing issues in the hands of one appointed judge. But, as a practical 
matter, the Court could simply refuse to follow such non-unanimous 
precedent in future cases. 
sfffK==qeb=ifjfqp=lc=jv=molmlp^i=
This proposal would not solve all the problems of U.S. Supreme 
Court history, like those posed by cases that did not invalidate laws on 
constitutional grounds. For example, the Korematsu case, since it val-
idated the Japanese exclusion order of the executive branch by a split 
vote, but did not invalidate it, would still stand.77 So would Buck v. 
Bell, the notorious 1927 decision over Justice Butler’s dissent uphold-
ing Virginia’s compulsory sterilization law.78 Indeed, the problem of 
Plessy v. Ferguson,79 the decision from the 1890’s which upheld seg-
regation in railroad cars,80 would be untouched by this proposed rule 
requiring unanimity to constitutionally invalidate laws. Neither would 
 
 75. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 76. The fact that it would annoy the parties is just a perk. 
 77. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 78. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 79. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 80. Id. at 551. 
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the rule affect the split ruling in the controversial Kelo81 decision in-
volving the U.S. Supreme Court upholding a dubious exercise of the 
power of eminent domain.82 
Since these problematic regulations originated with the political 
branches, they could have been corrected by the political branches; for 
the U.S. Supreme Court was not the final word on these matters. The 
political reaction to the Kelo decision is instructive, as a number of 
states and municipalities amended their eminent domain laws to re-
quire a more specific public use rather than a catch-all public purpose, 
which Kelo’s majority allowed for.83 
Finally, there is also a possible problem with the unanimity ap-
proach: conditioning the Court’s ultimate power of invalidation on 
constitutional unanimity allows for a hold-out Justice to make unrea-
sonable demands in return for his or her vote. This could lead to a kind 
of stalemate or paralysis of the Court, the inability to achieve unanim-
ity. We could be trading one problem for another, as in the devil you 
know being better than the devil you do not. But the cost of this would 
merely empower the political process to resolve the issue, as a practical 
matter. What would be so bad about that? Further, if a Justice holds 
out, frequently alone, then it could motivate a political outcry, giving 
bite to the paper tiger of impeachment or conceivably motivate a con-
stitutional amendment. 
Obviously, this modest proposal could not solve all the problems 
of U.S. Supreme Court history and it may not be practicable as a rule 
of decision-making by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, where the 
stakes are often so high and such serious implications may result from 
a decision, I urge the reader not to simply dismiss it as an academic 
exercise meant for the classroom. Recall again the horrifying conse-
quences of assertions made by the majority in the Dred Scott case: 
620,000 dead, the toll of the Civil War.84 And while such a war is now 
inconceivable, the bad blood stirred and stewing in an already divisive 
and volatile political climate as a result of such decisions is a conse-
quence a civil society could well do without. 
The Court’s greatest decisions have been unanimous ones and its 
lousiest decisions, the bloopers of constitutional history, have 
 
 81. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 82. Id. at 484. 
 83. Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82 (2015). 
 84. Drew Gilpin Faust, Death and Dying, NAT’L PARK SERV.,   https://www.nps.gov/nr/ 
travel/national_cemeteries/death.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
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largely been split decisions. Contrast those split decisions invalidating 
laws on constitutional grounds with the huge success of Brown v. 
Board of Education85 where the Court spoke unanimously and author-
itatively and eventually succeeded in convincing the country of the 
rightness of its decision, as evidenced, for example, by the eventual en-
actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86 Unanimity should be con-
sidered a stand-in for unquestioned authority. 
Moreover, to empty split decisions of constitutional force 
will merely mean that the political branches will be able to deal with 
the controversial subjects. This will make our republican polity 
more democratic and our legislators more accountable to the people. 
It will also favor practical compromises over ideological impasse. As 
one of my heroes Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York during the 
1920’s used to say, “The only cure for the evils of democracy is 
more democracy.”87 
 
 
 85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 86. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 87. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 296 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2007). 
